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Introduction
The ICC was established to prosecute and punish persons guilty of the most serious crimes known to mankind. To facilitate this objective, suspects are arrested and transferred to the seat of the Court and, often, remanded in detention throughout their trial. As with national criminal justice systems, international prosecutions do not necessarily result in convictions. Proceedings may be terminated for a variety of reasons and acquittals can be handed down at either first instance or on appeal. The Rome Statute (ICCSt), for the first time in international criminal law, contains a compensation scheme for arrested or convicted persons.
Article 85 empowers the ICC to provide compensation for the deprivation of liberty in three situations: unlawful arrest or detention (Article 85(1)), wrongful conviction (Article 85(2)) and, in exceptional circumstances, acquittal or termination of proceedings due to a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice (Article 85(3)). As they reflect, and indeed, virtually repeat verbatim, existing and customary human rights remedies, 1 the former two provisions are not controversial. Article 85(3), on the other hand, goes beyond contemporary human rights law. In contrast to the ease with which delegates at the Rome Conference were willing to accept statutory provisions that reflected contemporary international treaty law, 2 there was no consensus in relation to the proposal to adopt a provision granting a power to compensate acquitted persons. Article 85(3) originated from a Japanese proposal at PrepCom to compensate persons pronounced innocent and those detained but never prosecuted. 3 The lack of agreement on this power was demonstrated by the fact that the proposed provision was entirely in square brackets. 4 States were concerned that such a power would adversely impact on Prosecutorial discretion to bring proceedings, and accordingly, if such a compensatory power was to be granted by the statute, that it should be restricted to instances of malicious prosecution.
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Given these concerns and the fact that there was no legal duty to provide for compensation of this kind, Article 85(3) must be welcomed as an innovative and progressive development of international (criminal) law. The decision to include a statutory power to award compensation to acquitted persons or persons against whom proceedings have been terminated can be understood in light of the particularities of the international criminal justice system and the need to bridge a remedial gap in the international legal framework. The provision does not, however, grant a right to such persons and the judicial power to grant an award is restricted by a number of statutory and regulatory fetters.
This chapter examines the scope of this new remedial power in international criminal law, analysing the reasons for its adoption, the limits on its use and the need to rethink the form and nature of the delivery of redress in this context. In other words it explores the legal, practical and personal costs of suspicion in the international criminal justice context for both suspects and the prosecuting institution.
Reasons for adopting Article 85(3): the particularities of the international criminal justice context
In addition to the general reasons in favour of adopting a compensation scheme for victims of mistakes of criminal justice process, there are reasons particular to the international criminal justice system that support the inclusion of this remedial power in the ICCSt. These particularities include the acquittal rate, the practice in relation to terminating proceedings, the use and impact of international remand detention and the difficulties encountered when trying to relocate acquitted persons after release from such detention.
Fallibility of international criminal justice process
If the facts and figures of the UN ad hoc tribunals provide an indication of what the ICC can expect, then it is clear that a compensation scheme for acquitted accused persons is a very welcome development. At both institutions, the acquittal rate was over 20% of completed cases.
The ICTY issued 161 indictments. However, as 36 indictments were withdrawn, some cases are on-going and thirteen cases have been transferred to national jurisdictions -the number of completed cases is much smaller. Of the 97 completed cases to date, 6 eighteen persons have been acquitted on all counts. Eleven persons by the Appeals Chamber. 9 Seven persons had their convictions (and sentences ranging from 2-27 years) reversed by the Appeals Chamber.
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The ICTR issued 93 indictments in total. Of these, seven cases are on-going, nine fugitives remain, four persons were transferred to national jurisdictions and two persons died before the conclusion of their trial. Of the 71 finalised cases, fourteen persons were acquitted on all charges and released. At first instance, six accused persons were unanimously acquitted on all counts.
11 Several unanimous first instance acquittals were confirmed on appeal, 12 although some by majority decision. 13 Some acquittals were the result of the reversal of convictions on appeal. Justin Mugenzi and Prosper Mugiraneza had their 30 year sentences overturned by a majority decision.
14 The convictions of Ndindiliyimana, Nzuwonemeye and Zigiranyirazo were unanimously reversed and a verdict of not guilty entered by the Appeals Chamber.
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At the ICC, of the three completed cases to date, one (Mr Ngudjolo) has resulted in a unanimous acquittal on all counts at first instance, 16 which was affirmed by a majority decision by the Appeals Chamber.
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These figures reveal a high acquittal rate at international criminal courts and strengthen arguments in support of establishing a compensation scheme for acquitted persons. The provision adopted by the ICCSt is not, however, limited to instances of acquittal.
Termination of proceedings
Article 85(3) may also be used to provide redress to persons who have been released from detention following the termination of proceedings against them because of a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. The case-law of the ad hoc tribunals provides some examples of scenarios that would potentially qualify under this heading.
The majority of the 36 indictments withdrawn at the ICTY were withdrawn against indictees that were not in the custody of the Tribunal due to either their (suspected) death or the re-evaluation of prosecutorial strategy to focus on high-level perpetrators. 18 At the ICTR, the only instance where the charges were withdrawn in cases other than of persons who had deceased involved decisions to withdraw indictments to facilitate investigations and prosecutions by national authorities in Belgium. 19 Several proceedings have also been terminated at the ICC due to evidence of the death of the suspect. 20 Such cases would not fall within the scope of Article 85(3). There were, however, some notable cases of indictments being withdrawn after indictees had spent time in international custody. At the ICTY, for example, Marinko Katava, Pero Skopljak and Ivan Šantić spent between 2 and 3 months in the UNDU following their voluntary surrender. Nenad Banović spent 5 months in remand custody in The Hague following his arrest. In all of these cases, the Prosecutor sought leave to withdraw the indictments due to having an insufficient evidential basis to justify or continue proceedings. In the decisions ordering their release, while the judges accepted the right of the Prosecutor to conduct investigations, they noted the emergency of such situations and warned the Prosecutor to in future 'act expeditiously on matters of such fundamental importance as the liberty of the accused'. 21 Moreover, it was in the 'interests of justice to restore ( . . . ) [their] right to liberty without delay'. 22 These situations (whereby indictees have spent time in custody before proceedings were terminated) provide examples of cases that could fall within the scope of Article 85(3).
There have also been examples of the wrong person being remanded in custody. In 1996, Goran Lajić's release from the UNDU and transfer back to Germany was ordered after the Prosecutor realised he was the wrong person. 23 Agim Murtezi spent 10 days at the UNDU following his arrest by KFOR in Kosovo, before being released after the realisation that this was a case of mistaken identity. 24 These cases provide clear examples of situations that could and should fall within the scope of Article 85(3).
It is important to note, however, that Article 85(3) refers to the termination of proceedings, and not the withdrawal of indictments. At the ICTY, indictments were withdrawn due to a lack of evidence without prejudice to the Prosecutor's right to bring the same or similar charges again at some point in the future if sufficient additional evidence became available. 25 This practice has been replicated at the ICC.
In the Kenyatta case, the Prosecutor sought the withdrawal of charges due to a lack of evidence and the Trial Chamber's refusal to grant an adjournment until such time as the Kenyan Government cooperates. 26 Even in this situation, the withdrawal of charges was 'without prejudice to the possibility of bringing new charges at a later date based on the same or similar factual circumstances' on the basis of additional evidence. 27 There have also been instances where the Pre-Trial Chamber has refused to confirm the charges against an individual without prejudice to the Prosecutor's right to request confirmation of charges at a later date if additional evidence is presented. 28 Decisions declining to confirm or to withdraw charges (to date) have had a suspensive effect only. Moreover, this legal limbo does not seem to have a maximum permitted time-frame. As proceedings are not terminated, the indictment remains open. Formalised suspicion and stigma remains, as does the potentially indefinite threat of future prosecution and detention. This approach also bars such suspects from applying for compensation under Article 85(3). This is significant given that such individuals may have spent time in international custody pending the PTC decision. For example, Mr Mbarumshimana spent 11 months in custody at the ICCDC before being released five days after a majority decision by PTC III refusing to confirm charges against him. 29 Reliance on, and the potentially excessive length of, international remand custody are important reasons to support the adoption of Article 85(3).
The use of international remand detention
The compensation scheme established by Article 85(3) aims to remedy the consequences of grave and manifest miscarriages of justice. One of the most visible consequences of such an injustice is likely to be the excessively long period of time accused persons typically spend in custody pending finalisation of the case against them. For example at the ICTY, Zejnil Delalić spend 1 000 days in custody, mostly in isolation, 30 Accused persons at the ICC can apply for release pending trial, and any decision in this regard must be reviewed every 120 days. 47 The legal procedure does not, however, address the practical and legal problem that the Host State is reluctant to facilitate the provisional release of international suspects onto its territory. The ICC has had to conclude bilateral agreements with third States to facilitate such release.
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The realities of the international context mean that it is foreseeable that acquitted accused persons may spend longer in detention than a convicted person at the national level. While no-one would argue that such lengthy detention in a foreign country is not a serious burden to be imposed on accused persons, it has continually been upheld as lawful by international criminal courts.
While detention infringes upon the right to liberty, this right is not absolute. Detention on the basis of a reasonable suspicion is an explicitly recognised ground for liberty deprivation in human rights law. 49 International criminal procedure aims to verify that reasonable suspicion exists and thereby ensure the legality of international detention. In contrast to the procedure of the UN Tribunals, whereby an arrest warrant was issued after the judicial confirmation of an indictment, 50 a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC issues the arrest warrant before a hearing for the confirmation of charges. 51 An arrest warrant can be issued where there are reasonable grounds to believe the person committed crimes and if it is necessary to ensure attendance at trial, to prevent the obstruction of investigations or the commission of related crimes.
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Reasonable suspicion, however, only legitimises the initial detention. Continued detention requires additional justification on relevant grounds of public interest such as the prevention of the commission of further offences, flight of the accused, social disturbance or interference with the administration of justice. 53 Significantly for the purposes of this chapter, it is important to note that 'a subsequent acquittal does not render the earlier determination of a detention-justifying ground illegitimate'. The repeated judicial affirmations of the lawfulness of such lengthy periods of detention by international courts, however, stretches human rights thresholds to their limits and such practice is viewed by many as a way of avoiding the need to acknowledge rights violations that would require the release of indicted or accused persons (see below).
There have been strong dissenting opinions in relation to whether acquitted accused persons' rights have been violated by lengthy detention. 55 These opinions referred, however, to fair trial rights rather than the right to liberty. Even then, the focus was on the length of time taken to render judgment following the close of argument (three years; two years and ten months), and not the overall length of proceedings (which were considered acceptable due to their complex and litigious nature Therefore, even though human rights law recognises that detention for an unjustifiably long period renders it unlawful, 59 the international criminal courts have relied on human rights jurisprudence that has accepted the lawfulness of lengthy periods of detention by national authorities in particular cases to justify an overall policy of lengthy pre-judgment detention. Although European penal policy explicitly warns against adopting such a policy in relation to foreign prisoners, 60 lengthy detention is likely to continue to be considered necessary for the majority of internationally accused persons for a number of reasons: the gravity of the charges against them; their perceived risk of flight or interference with witnesses or evidence; and the lack of an international police force to secure attendance at trial by re-arrest. The impact of detention is a subjective experience and is not, necessarily, directly related to the length of such detention. For example, Marinko Katava was detained at the UNDU for 2 months before the case against him at the ICTY was terminated. The trauma of his detention, in what was a very security focused regime at the time, led him to design and erect a statue in his home town, Vitez, to testify to the fundamental importance of liberty.
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The impact of an international indictment on an individual's reputation will vary depending on the circumstances. 
Relocation after release
The process of adjusting to life after long periods of detention has practical, financial, emotional and legal dimensions. The released person may not have access to money, whether due to their assets being frozen, the cost of defence, the lack of earnings or pension, or the use of savings to support their families during their custody. Spending time in detention in a foreign country will put strain on family relationships. Many international detainees only receive visits once or twice a year. Even with the ICC's more progressive and supportive approach to maintaining family 67 Manns (n 62) 26. 68 Huff cited in J. Chinn and A. Ratliff, ' "I was put out the door with nothing" -Addressing relationships, 73 communications are often restricted to letters and phone calls.
Moreover, forms of adaption that are functional in the prison context may be dysfunctional and counter-productive in the post-release social and family context. 74 Released persons may struggle with feelings of estrangement and loss, and find it difficult to restore previously close relationships. 75 There may also be, foreseeably, significant relational, psychological, financial and even safety consequences for family members, spouses and children in particular. 76 Readjustment may be even more difficult in a post-conflict setting. A study of 50 former fighters released from Padema Road Prison in Freetown after proceedings against them were terminated noted that their release into a volatile post-conflict environment without support to reintegrate meant that they simply moved 'from one form of confinement to another'. 77 Jefferson explains that this continuity of confinement was created due to a lack of security, stigma and marginalisation.
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While some of the issues (freedom of movement and assembly) in this situation were caused by a lack of paperwork demonstrating that the individuals had no case to answer, 79 physical release had not brought real freedom.
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The situation can become even more complicated for persons detained at the Host State of an international court. Past cases have demonstrated the long-lasting and significant impact an indictment by an international court can have on an individual. For some acquitted accused, they have returned home quietly, others to a hero's welcome. For others, the situation has not been so straightforward. Even when charges are dropped or an individual is acquitted, the international detention facility may not be able to release the individual immediately 81 due to international travel bans imposed following an indictment. 82 For some acquitted persons, the situation is much more serious than a delay in effecting release. For several persons acquitted on all charges by the ICTR, it meant moving from remand custody in an international detention facility (after pre-trial detention of seven -eight years) to custody in a safe house in the host State. 83 The MICT has now assumed responsibility for the ICTR acquitted accused housed in Tanzania, some of whom have been seeking relocation for over eight years. 84 Unable to return to their country of origin (Rwanda) due to fears for their personal safety and the risk of persecution, 85 and without the agreement of a third State to grant them asylum, 86 they are confined to the four walls of a safe house in an unprecedented state of legal limbo. The restrictions placed on their movement and other rights mean that these acquitted persons consider the time spent in safe houses in Tanzania to be a continuation of their detention by the Tribunal. 87 These acquitted accused persons have 'no travel documents, no passports, and no official legal status ( . . . ) [and] there is nothing in the Statute or the Rules governing the status or the social reintegration of the acquitted accused'. 88 There are both practical and legal obstacles. Without travel documents, these persons are restricted to making claims for asylum at embassies. However, as Heller explains, very few countries accept asylum claims made at their embassies. 89 Even if the acquitted accused could access the territory of a State to request asylum, Heller notes that the State could refuse the request on the basis of the original indictment. The evidential burden required for an acquittal may still mean that significant doubt remains to their guilt which entitles States to invoke Article 1F of the Refugee Convention which enables countries to deny asylum to persons if there are 'serious reasons for considering' that they have committed a war crime or crime against humanity. 90 In regards to their liberty status, they are no longer detained by the international court. But they are not free; they cannot freely move about in the host State and, indeed, there have been reports that the regime they are subject to in the safe house is stricter and less humane than the regime they were subject to in the UNDF. 91 They remain separated from their families and friends. Despite their acquittal, these men continue to be viewed as international pariahs and genocidaires who pose a threat to order and security. 92 In addition to the continuing stigma, these acquitted accused persons are 'serving time for crimes they have not committed. They are paying an unfair price for having been suspects'. 93 Given the fact that it was foreseeable that similar issues could occur for the ICC, 94 it is disappointing that a stalemate situation arose in relation to the 108 He felt that the ICC should have insisted on compliance or referred the matter to the arbitral tribunal stipulated in article 55(2) HQA. 109 Perhaps the ICC should have done so, given that following the affirmation of his acquittal by the Appeals Chamber in February 2015, Mr Ngudjolo was re-arrested by Dutch authorities and transferred to the airport where a flight had been scheduled to effect his deportation to the DRC. This happened without the prior knowledge of Mr Ngudjolo or his legal representatives, and in spite of his claims to the ICC Appeals Chamber that he was unable to return to the DRC, or indeed any African nation on account of his cooperation with the ICC and his testimony incriminating a head of an AU state, President Kabila. He stated that as he was now 'deemed a traitor' he was at risk from attack from both military and non-military groups. 110 The issue remains, again, with the Dutch immigration authorities. This event really undermines the bilateral treaty in place between the ICC and the Host State and creates a dangerous precedent for on-going cooperation in this regard. For acquitted accused persons (and the Court responsible for assisting them) it creates the danger of continued detention and uncertainty in relation to the very basic question of which country they will live in upon release. This situation is unfortunate given the existence of an explicit legal framework establishing who is responsible for relocating such persons. Yet the practical and political obstacle that they are released onto the territory of a host State is unavoidable. Given these very real difficulties, the inclusion of a power to award compensation to acquitted accused persons must be welcomed.
Conclusion
Article 85(3) ICCSt is innovative and unique in the international legal arena.
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It provides a power to grant compensation to persons who have been deprived of their liberty, despite the fact that proceedings were later terminated or they were found not guilty of all counts charged, for the first time in international law. This power is necessary in the international criminal justice system given the lengthy detention faced by many accused persons pending the finalisation of their trials. In addition to its excessive length, the impact of this detention is aggravated by its implementation in a foreign country away from family and friends and the stigma attached to an international indictment. This lasting stigma can have devastating results for the individual's reputation, relationships, livelihood and, even (worryingly) their liberty and freedom of movement. The inclusion of article 85(3) attests to the recognition of the real, lasting and complex problems faced by the individual and his or her family, and bridges a gap in the remedies that were available to international courts.
Bridging a remedial gap
The adoption of Article 85(3) was important as it provided a statutory basis to address some of the problem outlined above, and in so doing, bridged a remedial gap in international (criminal) law. This section outlines the problems faced by international courts that did not have an explicit statutory power to grant compensation and the reluctance to grant traditional remedies demonstrated by the international judiciary.
The consequence of a lack of inherent power
While there are examples of national legislative schemes that provide compensation for the harm caused by the detention of persons who are released following an acquittal or termination of proceedings, 112 there was, prior to the ICCSt, no such scheme in international law. 113 Indeed, the current human rights law provisions upon which Article 85(1) and (2) are based exclude remedies in situations where the detention was lawful and the defendant was acquitted. 114 Because of this, and the receipt of requests for compensation from persons acquitted on all counts following lengthy periods of detention, the Presidents of the ICTY and ICTR wrote to the UNSC asking for amendments to the Tribunals' statutes that would facilitate such compensation. 115 As the judges of the UN Tribunals acknowledged, Article 85(3) has no equivalent in international human rights law and it is not part of customary international law. 116 That being said, these judges still felt that it would be in the interests of the Tribunals and the UN to award compensation to accused persons who are acquitted or who have proceedings against them terminated because of the 'particular circumstances' in which the Tribunals operate and the long periods of pretrial detention faced by accused persons. It was unfortunate that this request was not accepted. Without an explicit statutory power to grant such compensation, the judges of these institutions felt they were unable to award a remedy in these circumstances. 117 In contrast to the approach adopted where there has been a violation of an enumerated right, the judges of the ICTY and ICTR have rejected claims that they have an inherent power to grant a remedy in cases where there is no explicit underlying right, citing, inter alia, the fact that granting a remedy would go beyond their powers and create financial implications.
The Rwamakuba case demonstrates this dual approach and highlights the significance of the inclusion of Article 85(3). Despite spending nearly eight years in detention before being acquitted on all counts at both first instance 118 international law. 121 In other words, the judges could not grant compensation for lengthy detention without an explicit statutory or regulatory provision or precedent upon which to base such an award. This can be contrasted with the practice of relying on an inherent judicial authority to award remedies in instances of violations of recognised rights. Indeed, this inherent authority was relied upon to grant Mr Rwamakuba monetary compensation and non-monetary assistance for violations of his fair trial rights. 122 This was in spite of opposition by the Registrar who argued, inter alia, that compensation could not be awarded in the absence of a statutory provision or rule, particularly given unsuccessful attempts by the Tribunals' Presidents to have the legal framework amended to facilitate such a power. 123 The Appeals Chamber, dismissing these claims, 124 based the inherent authority to grant a remedy for violations of fair trial rights on the statutory duty to ensure a fair trial and respect for the rights of the accused (Article 19(1) ICTRSt), the need to provide an effective remedy for human rights violations (derived from ICTR and ICTY case-law and international human rights treaty law), and previous decisions noting the authority of the Tribunal to award financial compensation for human rights violations. 125 Where enumerated rights had been violated, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber's finding that internal institutional considerations related to the execution of an order, including budgetary matters, are separate considerations from the Tribunal's authority to award an effective remedy in the form of financial compensation ( . . . ) Budgetary considerations cannot interfere with the Tribunal's authority to award financial compensation as an effective remedy for a human rights violation.
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Both Chambers in this case, however, rejected the argument that they had an inherent power to award a monetary remedy for wrongful prosecution. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber referred to the failed attempt by the ICTR President to seek such express powers and budgetary resources from the UNSC. 127 Without a violated enumerated right, there was no legal duty to provide an effective remedy. Without a legal duty to provide a remedy, there was no budget line to draw from. The rejection of an inherent power to grant a remedy in such cases has resulted in claimants at other tribunals arguing for a remedy on the basis of violations of established rights. In a recent claim submitted to the MICT by an acquitted accused person, for example, while Article 85(3) was referred to, this was only to make the point that a broader approach to compensation has been adopted within the international criminal law context. The legal basis for the claim submitted was the breach of fundamental and explicit rights (notification of charges and undue delay). 128 Moreover, the ICTR case-law outlined above was cited to support the argument that financial compensation could be paid for violations of the rights of accused persons even in the absence of an explicit statutory provision granting the judges the power to do so.
In light of the difficulties experienced at the ad hoc Tribunals because of the lack of both an explicit and inherent power to grant a remedy in such circumstances, Article 85 (3) Starr argues that, in the international criminal justice context, 'an absolutist approach to the right to an effective remedy may be self-defeating' as it may result in no remedy being awarded.
146 Therefore, it is both appropriate and desirable to adopt an interest-balancing approach that permits departure from the requirement of full remedy in face of strong legitimate countervailing considerations related to the institutional objectives of and operational constraints faced by international courts.
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As 'defendants' interests in broad rights and remedies cannot always trump these competing considerations,' 148 she argues that international judges should be able to grant less costly partial remedies. This approach is preferable as it results in a remedy being granted. If this reasoning is accepted, it could be argued that Article 85(3) represents an interest-balancing approach to remedies in the international criminal justice context. Rather than continuing the judicial fiction that violations of fair trial rights or the right to liberty are not occurring (due to the high costs of traditional remedies for such violations), Article 85(3) gives international judges the power to award compensation to acquitted accused persons to deal with the harmful consequences of excessive prejudgment detention in international remand centres. As Trial Chamber III of the ICTR observed, the significance of the principle established by Article 85(3) 'must be understood with reference to the right of any individual to freedom, including the corresponding principle that detention should remain exceptional or, at least, limited to what is reasonable and necessary'.
149 Indeed, the normative basis for the compensation of acquitted accused persons in many domestic systems is the need to try to counter-act the (exceptional) harm caused by legitimate government action resulting in detention. 150 Counteracting the negative consequences of lengthy periods of remand detention therefore appears to the implicit foundation for the remedial power granted by Article 85(3). This approach is in line with European penal policy. The Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers has recommended that member States provide compensation to 'persons remanded in custody who are not subsequently convicted of the offence in respect of which they were so remanded'.
151 Despite recognising that a legal basis for remand may have existed, the compensation is advocated on the basis of the nonpunitive nature of remand in custody. Michels argues that it is important to distinguish between distinct rights -the right to a speedy trial, the right not to be detained for an unjustifiably long period and any right to compensation for acquitted accused persons. 153 As he rightly states, the two former rights operate independently from findings of guilt or innocence and the remedy granted deals only with the periods that exceed what is considered a reasonable period of time. 154 He notes that the latter remedy is awarded in relation to the entire period of detention. But, Article 85(3) does not provide claimants with an entitlement to compensation. This power resulted from a fusion of the normative and principled foundations of the human rights protections against undue delay at trial (right to a fair trial) and excessive detention (the right to liberty). In other words, it addresses the harm caused by encroachments on these rights without the need to find an illegal act or violation of an enumerated right.
Operational efficiency and legitimacy
Article 85(3) does not create a right but a remedial tool to deal with the 'lawful' but worrying (and almost inevitable) consequences of international criminal justice process. Article 85(3) is necessary to empower judges to counteract the negative consequences of international indictments, prosecutions and detention. This power is not only of benefit to the applicant, but it is likely to have collateral benefits for the operational efficiency of the Court, and ultimately its legitimacy.
A compensation scheme of this type may result in caution and increased propriety in international investigations and prosecutions 155 
Conclusion
While Article 85(3) may ensure greater cautiousness and propriety in the ICC's prosecutorial strategy and use of remand detention, this remedial power should not be seen as a substitute for recognising and remedying violations of enumerated rights, however costly these remedies may be for the international courts' operations and mandate fulfilment. The strong human rights protection against, and remedies for, unlawful detention on account of its excessive length and unduly delayed trials are important deterrents against the abuse of coercive power (to prosecute and detain).
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Article 85(3) should not be used as a means to legalise or legitimise excessively lengthy detention or avoiding the costs of the true remedy for such rights violations by enabling international courts to essentially pay for human rights violations.
The introduction of a judicial power to deal with the realities of international detention prior to the finalisation of proceedings is vitally important. It provides judges with an explicit power to grant a remedy in the absence of an explicit or customary international human rights obligation to do so. This explicit statutory power means that any sums awarded have a direct budgetary source. It ensures equality of treatment: convicted persons can receive compensation in the form of sentence reduction for violations of their right to liberty or a trial within a reasonable time. 161 Finally, this power recognises that the legality of detention does not detract from its detrimental impact on the individuals subject to it. The ability of ICC judges to use this power has, however, been greatly restricted by thresholds and criteria established in the Court's statute and rules.
Eligibility for compensation under Article 85(3)
Article 85(3) provides the ICC judges with a power to grant compensation to 'unjustly prosecuted' 162 persons. This section outlines how this power is constrained by explicit statutory and regulatory provisions that create strict eligibility criteria.
Statutory thresholds
Article 85(3) contains several explicit criteria which applicants for compensation must be able to demonstrate.
Firstly, the individual must have been released from detention following a final decision of acquittal or a termination of proceedings. Accordingly, a person who was not remanded in custody would not be eligible for compensation.
Secondly, if the claimant has been acquitted, the acquittal must be final. The Prosecutor can appeal an acquittal on the grounds of a procedural, factual or legal error. 163 An acquitted person may be remanded in custody pending the outcome of the appeal, although this should only be in exceptional circumstances after consideration of a concrete risk of flight, the seriousness of the offence charged and the probability of success on appeal, 164 although any decision of this kind can be appealed. 165 If an acquittal is not appealed, it typically becomes final after 30 days.
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Thirdly, and significantly, the release from detention must have been ordered due to the discovery of a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice (GMMOJ) . 167 This term is not defined. The inclusion of both adjectives (grave and manifest) suggests a narrower cause of action than that created by Article 85(2) in cases of wrongful convictions. 168 This implicit requirement of a higher tier of injustice is troublesome
given that the term miscarriage of justice 'connotes a failing of monumental scale'.
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The deliberate inclusion of a narrower cause of action could be recognition of the fact than an acquittal (or termination of proceedings) is a remedy of sorts for mistakes in criminal justice process. However, as Sheehy argues, the concept of miscarriage of justice should cover all instances whereby the criminal justice process does not work properly, with serious adverse consequences for wrongly accused persons:
170 persons acquitted following a prior conviction 'are merely further along the "continuum toward outrage", as other categories of accused may suffer many of the same burdens as those wrongly convicted'.
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When seeking compensation at the ICTR, Mr Rwamakuba and his counsel argued that a GMMOJ had occurred on the basis of two distinct grounds. Firstly, they argued that the Prosecution had relied on false and unsatisfactory evidence to arrest and prosecute him. 172 The AC rejected this claim, stating no evidence or convincing arguments had been produced to substantiate these allegations. 173 The second ground was based on the lengthy detention he had endured (due to failings in the collection and presentation of evidence) and the denial of his right to an expeditious trial (due to Will the decision releasing the detainee suffice or will a separate hearing be required? Rule 173(2)(c) ICC RPE refers to notification of the decision of the Court concerning the existence of a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. This would seem to indicate that the determination of the existence of such a fact is a duty for the Court alone. But the importance of such a finding would seem to necessitate the hearing of the views of the persons alleging the miscarriage of justice. However, the requirement of a separate hearing may result in the creation of a potentially insurmountable evidential burden on the applicant. How do you prove a 'grave and manifest' miscarriage of justice has occurred? Further, will an acquittal based on a majority decision suffice? 178 This is an even more difficult question if these statutory requirements reflect an implicit preference for claims from persons who are (or at least appear to be) factually innocent (see below). For example the majority of first instance acquittals 179 and those affirmed on appeal 180 at the ICTY were unanimous decisions. In the case of acquittals on appeal, however, there has been more discord. While the Appeals Chamber unanimously reversed the convictions of Zoran, Mirjan and Vlatko Kupreškić, 181 Judge Liu disagreed with the majority decision to reverse Momčilo Perišić's conviction (and 27 year sentence). 182 In the Gotovina and Markač case, the acquittal came as the result of a slim 3-2 decision. 183 In their dissenting opinions, Judge Agius and Judge Pocar were not only extremely critical of the majority's reasoning and verdict, 184 they were perplexed as to why convictions had not been entered under alternate modes of liability. 185 Judge Meron ruled out this course of action on the basis that it would be unfair to the appellants to be found guilty of crimes that were different from those they defended against, 186 while Judge Robinson ruled it out as the fact finding required for new convictions did not come within the appellate function. 187 These comments do not necessarily reflect a view that the appellants were considered to be factually innocent. A similar situation arose at the ICC. Although Mr Ngudjolo's unanimous first instance acquittal 188 was affirmed on appeal, this affirmation was also the result of a bare majority decision. While three judges affirmed the first instance decision on the basis that it had not been materially affected by a procedural, factual or legal error, 189 Judge Tarfusser and Judge Trendafilova were highly critical of the majority's review of the alleged errors made by the Trial Chamber and concluded that the acquittal should have been reversed or amended and a re-trial ordered pursuant to Article 83(2) ICCSt. 190 Do conclusive facts of a GMMOJ exist when a minority of judges express a view that, due to the gravity of the errors made by the Trial Chamber in reaching a not guilty verdict,
191 a re-trial should be ordered? At the ICTY, Judge Robinson noted that a re-trial (an exceptional measure) would not be appropriate if it would be unduly oppressive to the appellants -which would be the case if the accused had already spent long periods of time in custody 192 and a retrial would be lengthy and expensive. 193 This view did not prevent the ICTY Appeals Chamber, by majority decision, granting the Prosecutor's appeal of an acquittal in the case of Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj and ordering a re-trial to facilitate the testimony of Prosecution witnesses. 194 Judge Robinson felt that as the case had already been extended several times on account of the Prosecutor's concerns about witness intimidation, ordering a retrial went beyond the powers of the Appeals Chamber and constituted a dangerous precedent as it prioritised the Prosecution's right to present its case over the accused's right to an expeditious trial. 195 Although TCI had unanimously acquitted Haradinaj (and ordered his release), 196 and acquitted Balaj by a majority (and ordered his transfer back to serve the sentence he was serving prior to transfer to the ICTY), 197 the AC ordered that they be remanded in custody pending the outcome of the retrial. 198 The new trial chamber unanimously acquitted these parties on all counts contained in the retrial indictment. 199 These parties faced seven years of uncertainty in relation to their fate. Does this make it a conclusive case of a GMMOJ? Does an acquitted person who has to be returned to serve a sentence for murder qualify for compensation under a discretionary scheme? It is clear that the statutory provision lacks clarity in relation to defining elements of the compensation scheme it establishes. Rather than add clarity, the rules that provide the detail for the operation of the scheme create further hurdles for claimants to overcome.
Regulatory requirements
The procedure for requesting and awarding compensation is set out in Rules 173 and 174. These rules contain several requirements that may become procedural bars for applicants.
The rules establish a strict six month time-frame for applications. 200 While a short time-frame can ensure potential claimants seek redress in a timely fashion, closing the claim for the ICC within a reasonable period, 201 there is a danger that it does not allow sufficient time for claimants to collate the evidence they need to substantiate their claim. 202 This is particularly true given the context: claimants will just have been released from international custody in a foreign country after a wrongful prosecution. 203 The six month time-frame, although replicated by the STL, 204 seems short when compared to national law. For example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, acquitted persons have three years to submit a claim for compensation to the State-level Ministry of Justice. 205 The statute of limitations ranges from between 1-10 years in statutory compensation schemes for wrongful conviction in the US, with an average of 2.6 years (although the Innocence Project recommends 3 years). 206 Debates during the drafting of the statute show that there was a lack of clarity about what the starting point for this time-frame should be. 207 The rules state that the time begins to run from the date the applicant was notified about 'the decision of the Court concerning ( . . . ) the existence of a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice under Article 85, paragraph 3'. 208 It is unclear if this rule introduces a requirement for the acquittal or decision terminating proceedings to explicitly state that there has a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice, or if, following an acquittal or termination of proceedings and an indication from the acquitted person that they intend to apply for compensation, a chamber must sit to decide if that case qualifies. The fact that the request must be made to the Presidency in writing (Rule 173(1)) would support a view that the request must occur after the proceedings that resulted in the acquittal or termination of proceedings.
209 Some argue that it would be more reasonable to have deliberations on compensation decided by the same Chamber that acquits the individual or terminates proceedings, as this would speed up the decision and reduce the burden on the Court by reducing the number of 'microproceedings unrelated to the main object of its jurisdiction'. 210 However this expedited format is excluded by the regulatory direction that the Chamber that decides upon eligibility and compensation must be composed with judges who have not participated in any previous judgment involving the applicant. 211 Although the term 'judgment' is used in the English version, reference to the French version suggests that the drafters' intention was to preclude the involvement of judges involved in any relevant decision by the Court at any stage of proceedings. 212 The written request must set out the grounds for the claim and state the amount of compensation sought (Rule 173(3) ). An earlier requirement for applicants to submit [written] evidence substantiating the amount sought was deleted as it was considered burdensome and vague. However, it is likely that this will be required in practice by those seeking compensation under Article 85(3) as they have no right to such remedy, and so must persuade the judges that they fulfil the criteria and that their case represents a sufficiently exceptional circumstance for the judges to exercise their discretion. 213 Claims at other international courts for compensation for violations of the right to liberty or right to a speedy trial have failed or been unsuccessful in securing the amount sought 214 due to a failure to clearly set out the heads of and provide evidence to prove claims and establish causality. 215 Finally, it seems that only the direct victim of the grave and manifest miscarriage of justice can apply for compensation. Although the rules state that 'anyone seeking compensation' can submit a request (Rule 173(1)), Article 85(3) only refers to the person who has been released from detention following a final decision of acquittal or a termination of proceedings. Relatives and heirs do not seem to have standing to make such a request, either in their own right or on behalf of their (deceased) relative. This restricted standing can be distinguished from the broader approach adopted in relation to applications to revise a conviction or sentence under Article 84, which can be exercised by close family members. 216 Zappalà has suggested that, in cases where the victim has died, the Prosecutor should file a request on their behalf. 217 While it is clear that the primary claimant should be the direct victim of the wrongful detention, there are no obvious reasons why close relatives and heirs should not be entitled to claim on the victim's behalf. In any case, in the event of a death, relatives should be able to pursue a submitted claim and receive any sums granted. 218 As it stands, however, it seems that claims for non-victims will be deemed inadmissible.
Determining Eligibility Claims
In addition to the strict eligibility criteria established by the statute and rules, this legal framework also imposes restrictions on the judicial discretion to award compensation. This section outlines the procedure for determining eligibility and analyses the fetters on judicial decision-making before advocating a reconsideration of this cautious approach.
Procedure
The Presidency's role in relation to implementing Article 85(3) is 'a purely administrative one ( . . . ) the Presidency has no power to reject the request and only 213 See ibid 629. 214 For example, the ICJ ordered the Democratic Republic of the Congo to pay the Republic of Guinea less than 1% of the compensation sought in the case of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo due to a lack of supporting evidence. See M. Andenas, 'Ahmadou Sadio Diallo' (2013) designates a Chamber to consider the request'. 219 Bitti suggests that the use of the word 'designates' 220 means the Presidency should nominate an existing three judge Chamber (either a Pre-Trial or a Trial Chamber). 221 The designated Chamber can decide whether to hold a hearing or to determine the matter on the basis of the request and any written submissions from the Prosecutor or the applicant. Importantly, Rule 174(2) also states that a hearing must be held if so requested by either the Prosecutor or the applicant. This was added to avoid violating human rights in relation to the requirements of a fair trial. 222 The STL rules differ in this regard: while the Chamber may hear the Prosecutor's views, the rules do not give the applicant the right to be heard.
223
The applicant is entitled to legal assistance during the procedure (whether there is a hearing or not). 224 This provision was necessary given that the statutory right to assistance (Article 67) only extends to accused persons awaiting the determination of charges against them. What is not clear is whether or not this assistance will be provided for free. Human rights law would suggest that legal aid should be granted in such compensation claims if the applicant lacks means, it is necessary to ensure access to a court and to ensure equality of arms (especially in complex procedures). Bitti has argued that these factors would suggest that legal aid must be granted for indigent applicants claiming under Article 85(3) to ensure he or she is not placed 'at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the Prosecutor'.
225
The decision on eligibility (and any award) must be made by majority decision (Rule 174(3) ). The rules do not state that this decision be made public. This is in contrast to a human rights approach to due process and statutory directions in relation to other pronouncements of chambers of the Court.
226 This is also unfortunate given the need to remove the stigma that attaches to wrongly accused persons. The rules also fail to state that the decision needs to be reasoned. This issue was actually debated at length during the drafting of the statute. Unfortunately the requirement to provide reasons was deleted following a request from the Russian and Spanish delegation due to a perception that, as there was no right to such compensation, the judges should not be burdened with a requirement to set out their reasons.
227 This is disappointing from a due process perspective, and seems contrary to contemporary human rights law. 228 It is also unfortunate given that there is no practice in this regard to draw from. Moreover, human rights jurisprudence on compensation for unlawful detention and wrongful convictions has been criticised for its lack of analysis and a failure to articulate the principles governing the determination of awards. 229 The ICC should make its reasons for determining whether an individual is eligible for compensation clear. The judges should deliver reasoned decisions to ensure transparency and the development of a coherent set of principles on compensation.
Other delegates felt there was no need to include reasons for decisions, as they are final: decisions cannot be appealed.
Judicial discretion, exceptional circumstances and the consequences of assessing factual innocence
In contrast to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 85, which incorporate existing human rights remedies and provide directly accessible rights, paragraph 3 grants a judicial power to consider claims. In addition to the criteria discussed above, this discretion is further fettered by the statutory direction that the power to grant compensation should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances. This not only narrows the scope of the field, but it may also require an enquiry into the factual innocence of the claimant.
Limitations are often included in compensation schemes to try to prevent persons found not guilty due to a technicality or those considered factually guilty from receiving compensation. As Sheehy points out, 'factual innocence ( . . . ) plays a central role in ( . . . ) compensation claims, restricting the right to have a claim heard, acting as a device for burden allocation and 'gatekeeping' and determining deservedness of ( . . . ) compensation'. 230 Just as it is possible to wrongfully convict, criminal justice process may also result in wrongful acquittals. 231 Indeed, this potentiality is recognised by the ICCSt; it enables the Prosecutor to appeal an acquittal 232 and the Appeals Chamber to reverse the acquittal or order a re-trial if the first instance decision was unreliable or materially affected by a procedural, factual or legal error. 233 In the context of international criminal trials in particular, there will be little support for a system that provides financial gains to persons who are considered to be factually guilty. As Beresford notes, however, 'an effective way to separate the truly innocent from those found not guilty has yet to be discovered'. 234 The statutory right to be presumed innocent results in the onus being placed on the Prosecutor to prove an accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 235 Any requirement of proof of innocence from the claimant inverts this principle, reverses the burden of proof and risks undermining not only the presumption of innocence, but also the acquittal judgment itself. The Statute states that it is for the Court to find the facts that there has been a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. In the absence of a prior judicial determination of such facts, however, it is likely that the applicant will have to provide evidence. As Beresford notes, a claimant may not be able to prove his innocence due to factors beyond his control, such as the death of a witness. 236 In addition, as previously mentioned, the judges that decide on eligibility cannot have participated in any previous judgment regarding the applicant. 237 While it is true that 'judicial impartiality is both an essential organizing component of any legitimate judicial institution and a core right for persons brought before such an institution,' 238 this requirement may result in not only another proceeding, but also another review of the facts to determine whether the prosecution and subsequent detention was indeed a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. The ECtHR has been highly critical of requirements of this kind in national compensation schemes. In Austria, for example, claimants had to dispel suspicions in order to receive compensation, and in Norway, claimants had to show that it was probable that they did not carry out the act that formed the basis of the charge. 246 These requirements have been repeatedly criticised by the ECtHR, as a judicial determination that there is continuing suspicion as to guilt undermines the presumption of innocence protected by the Convention and violates Article 6. 247 In an 247 For example in his concurring opinion, Judge Greve noted in relation to the Norwegian law that 'the result is that a well-intended provision -that has proved valuable in a significant number of cases for attempt to bring their law in line with these findings, Austrian and Norwegian law now states that compensation cannot be refused or reduced on the basis of suspicions if the accused person has been acquitted by a final decision on the merits. 248 This jurisprudence has not, however, prevented the likelihood of guilt being a factor in judicial determinations; simply the explicit acknowledgement of the influence of this probability. 249 National practice has demonstrated that a requirement to prove innocence often creates a higher evidential burden for those claiming compensation than is required to avoid conviction. 250 In compensation statutes in the US, the most common burden of proof is 'clear and convincing evidence'. 251 For Article 85(3), 'conclusive facts' of a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice are required. Zappalà has suggested that what will be required is not so much a determination of factual innocence but 'a more concrete judgment as to the overall justice of the outcome of the proceedings'.
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What this means in practice, however, is not clear. Moreover, this appears to imply that a higher standard than 'on the balance of probabilities' is required. In fact, a requirement of conclusive facts seems more akin to a requirement to prove that a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice has occurred beyond reasonable doubt. A due process approach would reject the imposition of such a heavy burden on claimants and insist that 'the only appropriate test is one based on the merits of the claim.' 253 Indeed some would contend that compensation should be based on a broader (legal) notion of innocence that connotes that the presumption of innocence has prevailed. 254 According to Zappalà, the very fact that a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice has been found to have occurred should constitute an exceptional circumstance, and therefore, perhaps the draftsperson uses exceptional circumstances 'more as a wish than a limitation of the scope of the rule'. 
Reconsidering the restrictions on judicial discretion
Article 85(3) is a welcome addition to the ICCSt. It introduces the potential to grant a remedy to persons who were not previously entitled to redress under international law. However, as the ICTR judges recognised, Article 85(3) is a 'narrowly drafted provision'. 256 The contribution this compensation scheme can make to international policy and practice is limited by the inclusion of explicit and excessive restrictions. This scheme entails a number of weaknesses, including 'strict eligibility requirements, high standards of proof, numerous disqualifiers and short time limits'. 257 Moreover, the judicial discretion it grants is severely fettered by the requirement of the virtually insurmountable threshold of exceptional circumstances. 258 As Sheehy notes, 'deciding who is eligible to claim for compensation will be a defining element of any compensation scheme'. 259 The current threshold however seems to raise the bar for eligibility too high. The legal framework currently in place creates a multi-tiered system to determine eligibility that considerably narrows the field of claimants that will qualify. In fact, Triffterer feels that the current thresholds will mean that 'ordinarily no compensation will be paid to persons acquitted by the Court, or against whom proceedings have been terminated before final judgment.' 260 This threshold will deter potential claimants and risks violating the presumption of innocence and undermining the integrity of the Court's judgments. Moreover, a system that operates on the basis of unreasoned decisions, that cannot be appealed, lacks transparency and fails to uphold the principle of equal treatment.
261
To overcome these problems, the current legal framework should be revised and amended. The most important amendment would be the removal of the terms 'grave and manifest' used to describe the miscarriage of justice and 'exceptional circumstances'. Both terms convey the drafters' desire to restrict the scheme. 262 However, as some delegates at the Rome Conference agreed, 263 these requirements unnecessarily restrict the judicial power to make awards. The current test imposes a burden that 'may prove insurmountable, except to applicants who were the victims of the most abhorrent cases of prosecutorial misconduct.' 264 Rather than restrict initial eligibility, a better approach is for the statutory provision to create a cause of action, leaving decisions about deservedness (based on the merits) to the judiciary. Michels has recommended a similar course of action, advocating a discretionary power to award compensation to persons released from detention following a final decision of acquittal, where it is in the interests of justice to do so. 265 In contrast to the restrictions on eligibility found in the ICCSt, the Council of Europe has suggested that eligibility should be curtailed in situations where 'either the person remanded had, by his or her behaviour, actively contributed to the reasonableness of the suspicion that he or she had committed an offence or he or she had deliberately obstructed the investigation of an alleged offence'. 266 In other words, compensation would not be required where 'the behaviour of such persons may have had a significant influence on the decision to remand them in custody'. 267 An approach that bars claims from persons whose own (intentional or negligent) actions resulted in their detention or its prolongation can be found in national legislative schemes in Europe (Austria, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands). 268 Caution should be used when using attribution as a bar to eligibility given the risk of pressure from prosecutors or bad legal advice. 269 Rather than act as a bar, attributability could be used to reduce the quantum of any award granted to claimants whose acts or omissions contributed to their detention. 270 The curtailment of entitlement to redress on the basis of attribution of responsibility (as with the ICC and human rights approach to wrongful convictions) 271 and reference to the legal grounds for remand detention seems more appropriate than a restriction based on political and pragmatic concerns.
Conclusion
If 'grave and manifest' and 'exceptional circumstances' are retained, these terms must be defined and concrete tests established to determine if they exist. What length of detention or degree of prosecutorial impropriety is it necessary to establish to meet these thresholds? A practice direction or set of guidelines should be developed. Precise definitions and principles to govern decision-making will ensure a more transparent and fair system for adjudicating claims. The current procedure requires clarification on a number of other significant aspects. Is a determination of the likelihood of innocence required? If so, what standard of proof is required and on whom does the burden of proof lie? What constitutes 'conclusive facts'?
Without clear guidance, there is a danger that discretion will only be exercised in high profile cases that have created a political or popular reaction. It is important that all (potential) claimants are treated equally. The present scheme is overly restrictive and does not seem to accord with the policy objectives behind its introduction -to deal with the harmful consequences of the lengthy detention that results from international prosecutions. Reliance on (guided) judicial discretion, rather than strict (but undefined) explicit criteria, to decide on eligibility will ensure the system can actually provide an effective remedy to counteract the harm caused.
Rethinking redress
If a claimant is deemed eligible for an award under Article 85(3), the designated Chamber must decide on the amount of compensation (if any) to award. 272 This section explores the factors considered by judges in making this decision and what compensation, as a remedy, is meant to address. It proceeds to advocate a more holistic approach to the design and delivery of remedial justice that goes beyond financial recompense.
Compensation
Compensation is a retrospective remedy that should provide damages for what has been lost as a result of the harm caused. 273 This section examines what the remedy of compensation should entail, how the quantum of awards should be determined and how awards granted can be delivered.
The remedy of compensation
According to the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers, compensation to persons who are not convicted of the offence for which they are remanded in custody could cover 'loss of income, loss of opportunities and moral damage'. 274 In other words, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages can be sought. Pecuniary damages would include financial recompense for lost past and future earnings and pensions, reductions in property values or property loss (taking account of inflation and the devaluation of currency), past and present pain, suffering and injury to physical and mental health, punitive fines, 275 and legal fees and expenses.
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Non-pecuniary damages provide for moral injury and dignity violations such as harm to reputation, fear, humiliation and mental distress; loss of enjoyment of life; loss of consortium and interference with family relationships. 277 As the intangible and subjective nature of these forms of harm can make them difficult to prove or reflect in monetary terms, such damages are often presumed. 278 It is important to note the inclusion of the word 'any' in the Rule 175. 279 This was inserted to highlight the fact that such compensation is not a right but a discretionary power of the Chamber. 280 In other words, overcoming the eligibility thresholds will not necessarily result in an award of compensation. This suggests that a declaratory judgment could be handed down. This is doubtful for several reasons. Firstly, there has been no violation of an enumerated right to make a declaration about. Secondly, the ECtHR's practice of refusing to award compensation for recognised violations of Article 5(5) (ruling that a declaration of violation provides just satisfaction) has received sustained criticism. 281 Judge Robinson at the ICTY has argued that the formal recognition of a violation of the right to a fair trial (undue delay) does not provide a sufficient remedy, particularly where the breach is substantial and causes claimants psychological non-pecuniary damage: financial compensation is required in such cases. 282 Finally, a decision to award no compensation to claimants that have established exceptional circumstances and the occurrence of a GMMOJ is unlikely to be considered appropriate given the objectives of the Court (ending impunity, respect for victims and human rights protection).
Compensatory damages could also be nominal (symbolic), but this too is unlikely to be appropriate under this scheme. The level of damages awarded should be proportionate to the harm caused, 283 and it is important that 'real compensation and not mere damages must be awarded'. 284 It is unclear, however, what level of awards the drafters of Article 85(3) anticipated. Zejnil Delalic (detained for over two and a half years at the UNDU) sought €255 000 euros in compensation for legal fees, suffering in detention, loss of earnings and the collapse of his construction business in Austria, while Vlatko Kupreskić sought a minimum of US $10 million for the harm he suffered as a result of three years in detention. 285 In a recent claim submitted to the MICT, although it was acknowledged that it was 'difficult to attach a price tag' 286 to the loss of liberty, freedoms, income, reputation and family life, the claimant sought one million US dollars. 287 The amount of compensation awarded by regional human rights courts to applicants claiming under provisions similar to Articles 85(1) and (2) are often lower than expected 288 (although awards to applicants with successful claims of excessive delay at trial were significantly higher if the accused person was later acquitted when compared to awards granted to persons found guilty). 289 Jurisprudence reveals that this could be attributed to the fact that many claimants seeking compensation for human rights violations often fail to clearly articulate or substantiate (with evidence or legal argumentation) the heads or items of their claims. 290 Although it is not stated in the rules, it is likely that the claimant will have to (and should be advised to) provide specific, itemised grounds and demonstrate with evidence that the harm claimed both occurred and was caused by (or that it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be caused by) the charges and subsequent detention by the ICC. 291 Though the burden of proof will generally fall on the claimant, it is possible for the burden to be shifted to the Prosecutor once causation has been established. The judges, when considering the amount to award, are obliged to consider the consequences of the grave and manifest miscarriage of justice on a range of factors derived from human rights jurisprudence. 292 It seems that only the consequences of the GMMOJ for the claimant must be considered, and not the causes. Given the operational realities faced by the ICC, miscarriages of justice are likely to be attributed to structural causes rather than the acts or omissions of individuals.
293
Therefore although aggravated and punitive damages are theoretically available in addition to restitutionary damages under Article 85(3), they are unlikely.
Determining the quantum of an award
While the claimant may request a particular sum of compensation (Rule 173(4)), the amount (if any) to be awarded is to be determined by the designated Chamber (Rule 175). If the remedy is intended to address the consequences for the claimant on his personal, family, social and professional situation, 294 these must be assessed. The perceived impartiality of such assessment is crucial given that it will form the basis of the official response to a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. While the deciding judges cannot have been involved in the claimant's trial at any stage, they are still officials of the institution responsible for the harm caused. Independent input is critical in a compensation scheme that depends on discretion and that does not allow for the review of decisions. Moreover, such assessments are difficult and complex and international judges will not necessarily have the expertise required to determine the impact of the miscarriage of justice and the quantum and form of redress required to address this harm. On account of the need to ensure impartiality and the complex nature of such assessments, it is recommended that a team of independent experts be appointed to carry out this task.
In addition to taking caution in relation to arriving at a suitable and sufficient sum for any award, it is also important that the levels of any awards granted are justified. Sums awarded without reason or reference to pre-established guidelines risk being considered arbitrary and unfair. 295 Unfortunately, little guidance can be drawn from the jurisprudence of other international courts. The ICJ's discussion of the principles for determining the quantum of compensation has been criticised for being vague. 296 The ECtHR has also been criticised. Shelton notes that 'it remains hard to observe the workings of any principled decision-making' 297 and that decisions on damages are often notable for their 'lack of analysis or articulation of principles in regard to assessing damages ( . . . ) the Court never discusses the basis for the awards it makes, leaving much to speculation'. 298 The interpretation and application of the right to compensation in human rights law remains undeveloped in many respects 299 and decisions often 'do not attempt to quantify the harm [or] award precise relief'.
300
Due to the lack of practice to draw from, and the need to ensure a fair system, the ICC should adopt a practice direction or guidelines to govern such decision-making and ensure that decisions include precise and principled reasoning to ensure the development of a coherent body of jurisprudence.
Limiting the amount that can be awarded?
In addition to the difficulties associated with arriving at the sum to award, compensation schemes also create budgeting problems. Accordingly, some domestic systems rely on grids to set or restrict amounts that can be awarded for pecuniary damages.
301 National legislation can fix the amount that can be granted in relation to the time served in detention. been based on a per diem rate. 303 Limits on the total amount that can be awarded, irrespective of the time actually served, are also possible. 304 Fixed amounts can make it easier for judges to decide how much to award, for the institution to budget for potential claims and for claimants to predict the level of award they should receive. 305 The idea of adopting a maximum amount for awards received support in relation to Article 85(3). 306 However, setting such sums is difficult. They would need to be regularly reviewed and adjusted to ensure they reflect contemporary costs of living and inflation rises. Moreover, as Manns argues, while per diem or per annum rates of compensation might minimise administrative costs, they ignore the opportunity costs of detention and may result in the grant of symbolic or nominal sums that do not reflect the harm suffered by individuals. 307 What a system that uses damage schedules gains by providing a 'simple, efficient and economical resolution of claims,' it loses by limiting claims to economic loss. 308 Rather than adopt a fixed approach or limit the maximum amount that can be granted, the judges could be left to use their discretion. This would ensure that the award reflects the costs imposed on the individual claimant. This would also appear to be a fairer and fuller method of redress when considered in light of the problems of using what are necessarily arbitrary caps. 309 The wording of Rule 175 would suggest that the judges are required to undertake a subjective assessment of the impact of the miscarriage of justice on the individual claimant rather than an objective approach that seeks to standardise the amounts awarded. The grant of judicial discretion to determine what amount is appropriate in each case enables the remedy 'to reflect the real costs of pre-trial detention more comprehensively'. 310 Allowing for the recovery of all proximate or foreseeable damage can ensure a 'more complete recovery'. 311 On the other hand, reliance on wholly discretionary and individualised awards makes it 'extremely difficult to adequately budget ( . . . ) and to ensure a consistent source of funding'.
312
A hybrid approach could be adopted that sets a floor and cap, as well as daily or yearly rates, but that also allows for additional recovery based on assessments of the opportunity costs for individuals. 313 However, this does not remove the difficulties associated with fixing rates or limits. For the ICC, it will be very difficult to set limits that reflect the standard of living relevant to all potential claimants. For example, in making a recommendation for a floor and cap for awards for violations of Article 5 ECHR, Treschel opted for a per diem rate with a range of between €50 to €1 000. He acknowledged that this range was 'both broad and very rough' but felt it was necessary to 'enable the cost of living in the relevant states to be factored in'. Yet he also argued that the most important consideration should be that 'the compensation is substantial enough to highlight the value of personal liberty'. 314 In relation to the ICC system, Michels proposed that the amount of compensation should be fixed at a daily rate of €70. This does not seem to allow for differences in the cost of living or the varying impact the detention may have had on the individual. What is interesting is that using this proposed sum (€70 per day), Michels calculated that in 2010, the ICTY would have been liable to pay €790 510 in compensation to ten individuals who had, collectively, spent over 11 000 days in custody. 315 This calculation dispels concerns that such rights would have detrimental financial impact. This would amount to 0.34% of the annual budget of the ICTY. And this is assuming that all persons would qualify for compensation. Schemes based on narrow eligibility or judicial discretion, such as the one established by Article 85(3), are likely to be a 'negligible public expense'. 
Delivering financial compensation
While it is not stated explicitly, any awards granted under Article 85(3), as expenses of the Court, would be payable from the funds of the Court. 317 It is likely that any (successful) decision will state a total sum of compensation to be awarded to the claimant. There is no guidance about how such awards should be delivered. The sum could be transferred in a final lump sum. However, it is also possible to consider the use of regular instalments. While the payment of instalments might be considered an unjustifiably paternalistic approach if based on a view that the claimant is incapable of managing their own money, 318 this approach may be warranted on two grounds. Firstly, it may be appropriate where it has been established that the claimant's needs may vary over time or where they cannot be identified or accurately assessed at the time of the claim and therefore require on-going and continuous assessment. In this case, it may be appropriate to award an initial sum to compensate for the time spent in detention and associated costs with further assessed yearly sums to cover on-going and arising needs. Secondly, a regular payment option may be easier for the budget to absorb. This should not be taken to detract from the fact that international organisations have a duty to ensure they have finances in place to provide remedies where they have committed international wrongs.
319
6.2 Other forms of redress
As the previous section outlined, the rules focus on the determination of an amount (if any) of compensation to be awarded. The current legal framework does not therefore cater for non-compensatory or indeed, non-monetary redress. This differs from the broader approach adopted by the STL rules, which state that other forms of redress may be granted. 320 As the consequences of a miscarriage of justices can be both erosive and cumulative, 321 it may not be possible to restore the status quo ante with recourse to financial compensation alone. While compensation can have an 'ameliorative, restorative and therapeutic function', 322 some feel that when dealing with the complex harm caused by the loss of liberty, this traditional, monetary remedy is inadequate. 323 European penal policy recognises that 'although the damage suffered in many cases will require financial compensation, other forms of reparation may be more appropriate'. 324 International policy states that international organisations should provide a range of remedies including restitution, reparation, compensation and satisfaction. 325 Given the detrimental consequences of wrongful prosecution and detention, it may be necessary to ensure the availability of a form of remedy that can provide, inter alia, reputational repair, rehabilitative support and reintegration assistance. This section advocates moving beyond a solely monetary approach to remedies and proposes the adoption of a more comprehensive redress system.
Remedial responsiveness
Zdenkowski argues for a 'making amends' model of redress for wrongfully convicted persons, as 'it is not possible to reverse history and restore an individual with complete integrity to his former position'. 326 He argues, however, that it is 'possible to take account of what has happened and to attempt to be responsive to those changes'. 327 This idea of being remedially responsive to the impact detention
The I-ACtHR, basing this concept on autonomy, noted that remedies granted on this ground should reflect the irreparable loss or severe impairment of opportunities for professional and personal development caused by an encroachment on an individual's rights. 328 In other words, claimants should be viewed as more than 'mere agent[s] of economic production'. 329 Disappointingly, however, no award was made on this ground due to the difficulties of translating the concept into monetary terms: access to the court and the decision were held to constitute satisfaction. 330 Despite this, the concept can be and has been utilised to provide a normative basis for non-monetary remedies. For example, in the Cantoral Benavides case, Peru was required to pay for a university scholarship and associated living costs to one of the victims. 331 This concept could be developed to provide a principled basis for devising and awarding non-financial remedies at the ICC.
There is already practice of the grant of non-monetary remedies at the ICTR. In the Rwamakuba case, the Trial Chamber directed the Registrar to ensure that Mr Rwamakuba received, in addition to financial compensation, a public apology, assistance with resettlement for him and his family and with his children's education. 332 This approach seems to take a rehabilitative approach to restitution that focuses on restoring a person's reputation and health, and assisting with their reintegration into society. 
Reputational repair
The social stigma associated with being a former international detainee will vary with each claimant. For some it has not prevented their appointment or continuation in government positions. 334 An international indictment, arrest, prosecution and detention will often, however, attract global media attention. These actions, and the attendant publicity, can have a punitive and stigmatising effect that endures long after the formal termination of the international criminal justice process. 335 Even for acquitted persons, or persons against whom proceedings have been terminated, the mere existence of formal accusations can result in an enduring presumption of guilt. 336 As a Deputy Registrar at the ICTR noted, although defendants 'can't get more innocent than seven or eight judges telling the world that they are innocent ( . . . ) [s]omehow, the fact that they have been indicted haunts them for the rest of their existence'. 337 Heller argues that the international community should ensure that acquitted persons do not continue to 'suffer the legal stigma of being accused'. 338 Official apologies are often sought as a form of satisfaction. Apologies can both provide an explicit acknowledgement of the harm caused and prevent the same thing from happening again by creating awareness of the causes of the problem. 339 Apologies can assist with reputational repair. So can simple practical steps such as making the fact of the acquittal or termination of proceeding as prominent on the websites of the international courts as the fact of their indictment. Publicity notices can also be placed in international and local media. For example, in Japan a grant of compensation to acquitted accused persons will be published in the official journal and three newspapers of the claimant's choice. 340 Although it has been argued by international officials that a formal apology can suffice, 341 an apology should be seen as supplementary or additional form of redress only and not a substitute for a proper remedy.
Dealing with trauma
It is necessary to recognise that the mental health needs of claimants 'may be complex and substantial'. 342 Research has shown that wrongful detention can have long-lasting and significant consequences such as long-term personality change, posttraumatic stress and other psychiatric disorders. 343 Accordingly, remedies should include psychological and psychiatric support services that address any trauma caused by the wrongful detention. 344 Treatment needs can be immediate, to address specific conditions such as PTSD or depression, but also longer-term, requiring counselling to come to terms with the time lost on account of their deprivation of liberty.
345
Although this latter form of trauma can have a long-term impact on the claimant's physical and mental health, it can be difficult to assess at the time of release. 346 Rather persons with long-term or life-long medical insurance to cover the costs of any required interventions. 347 
Reintegration support
Wrongfully convicted persons in domestic criminal justice systems tend to 'fall on the periphery of any existing social service relief measures', 348 with little to nothing being done to 'ease the transition from prison to the real world'. 349 The situation is worse in the international criminal justice system, where there is no support for any released person. 350 Even the new conditional release system instituted by the SCSL, fails in this regard, focusing more on supervision than support. 351 This means that acquitted accused (or persons against whom proceedings have been terminated) at the ICC will not have access to any established reintegration support measures. This is unfortunate given the lengthy periods of detention likely to be involved in such cases. In addition to the usual reintegration problems faced by released persons (institutionalisation, health and relationship issues), persons released following a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice at the ICC may also have to deal with resettlement in a post-conflict society still in transition. Acquitted persons in the international context may require access to a scheme that can 'perform a stepping-stone function between prison and society and between war and peace'. 352 Detention at the seat of the Court in The Hague may mean, however, that acquitted accused persons cannot benefit from national demobilisation, peace-building or reconciliation programmes in their country of origin. 353 Moreover, a post-conflict society may not have a functioning probation system to provide support to released persons at a national level. This discussion assumes however, that the released persons can travel to their country of origin. Practice has shown that acquitted accused persons may face significant legal and practical problems that prevent their relocation.
Relocation
Release from detention following an acquittal at an international court has not always resulted in freedom. As the cases outlined in Section 2.5 above demonstrate, release following an acquittal can result in further custody in administrative detention, (threatened) deportation to a country were the individual fears persecution and restricted freedom of movement and association if they remain in the Host State. For Mr Ngudjolo, his 'acquittal instead became a nightmare. The trauma of his incarceration increased by the day ( . . . ) [he was] on the verge of depression as he had trouble understanding how such treatment could be inflicted on an acquitted person'. 354 Serious detrimental consequences of a miscarriage of justice can therefore continue after an acquittal or termination of proceedings in the international criminal justice context. Despite an explicit and negotiated division of responsibility between the ICC and the Dutch government in relation to the duty to relocate, 355 de facto statelessness and a legal limbo was imposed on the first person to be acquitted by the Court. As Heller argues, while the ICTR 'has proven admirably protective of its acquittees ( . . . ) acquitted defendants should not have to choose between living as virtual prisoners under international protection and returning home to face significant physical and legal dangers'. 356 The ICC, conscious of the need to deal with this issue, drafted a model agreement that can be entered between the Court and States in the 'event that a suspect acquitted by the Court would not be able to return to their State of nationality'. 357 Like the ICTR, 358 however, the ICC cannot oblige a State to grant asylum or residency rights: 'the reception of both an acquitted person and a protected witness is completely reliant on the voluntary cooperation of a State'. 359 Cooperation in this regard remains vitally important, not only to protect the fundamental rights of acquitted accused persons, but also to ensure respect for the Court's judgments. 
Re-entry support
A finding of not guilty and subsequent release may only be the beginning of a long and difficult transition period. 361 Persons who can claim under Article 85(3) are likely to have been released suddenly without the preparation, support and supervision normally provided to long-term prisoners due to be released in domestic systems. Such released persons can face the same challenges as other institutionalised persons, such as adapting to their regained freedom, changes in their family life and advances in technology. 362 While most adapt to practical changes, such as new technologies, in relatively short periods of time, 363 dealing with the impact of institutionalisation may take longer. They may also face problems associated with the operational difficulties faced by international courts. Re-entry support in this context is therefore vital. The re-entry requirements of each individual should be assessed and such assessments should form part of the discussion about the appropriate form of redress to grant. Re-entry assistance will be required immediately before and after release, but also over the longer term.
It is foreseeable that persons who have been declared indigent and detained for long periods of time in a foreign country without access to paid work (or available funds due to asset freezing) will have immediate financial needs upon release. They will have to pay for somewhere to live, food, clothing, insurance etc. The ICC should consider granting immediate transition loans (which could be deducted from any award made) or a grant to cover reasonable reintegration expenses incurred during this interim period that could be claimed in addition to compensatory damages. 364 Beyond these immediate basics, it can be more difficult to assess longer-term needs that may require other forms of assistance. It may be necessary to ensure that rather than view such support (only) as a remedy following a judicial decision on eligibility and merit, re-entry support should (also) be seen as an administrative responsibility of the Registry. It is already technically the Registry's responsibility to relocate such persons. Further, both the ICTR and ICC have practice of directly supporting and being responsible for acquitted accused persons who cannot be relocated. But the responsibility is broader than supporting acquitted accused persons stuck in this legal stalemate.
The potentially life altering consequences of international prosecution and detention discussed above will often necessitate more than financial recovery. This duty should be broadened to include all forms of reintegration support. The ICC's Registry along with the Presidency's Enforcement team should establish a Re-entry Team to ensure the enforcement of acquittal decisions and provide support to persons harmed by wrongful prosecutions.
A dedicated re-entry team could provide the coordinated and multi-disciplinary support such persons require. 365 Rather than assess such needs in an adversarial hearing, mediation could be used to discuss compensation claims and negotiate an individualised support package. A specialist team could provide a tailored approach to post-custody transition by assessing and delivering support in relation to both immediate and longer-term reintegration needs. This would involve a range of tasks such as organising access to accommodation upon release, and helping to secure and implement relocation treaties with cooperating States.
Conclusion
363 Armbrust (n 346) 176. 364 See Lonergan (n 76) 424-5. 365 Chinn and Ratliff (n 68) 407.
Article 85(3)'s restrictive thresholds mean that persons deemed eligible are likely to have suffered a very significant degree of harm. If the underlying goal is to address the harmful consequences of international remand detention, the remedy should be tailored to provide meaningful support that helps claimants rebuild their lives. The ICC should seek independent and expert advice when assessing the quantity of compensation to award and the method of delivery. Guidelines should be developed to ensure a transparent and principled approach to decision-making. Further, the ICC should adopt a broader approach to remedy than simple compensation. In fact a more holistic scheme would appear to be required by evolving human rights jurisprudence, contemporary penological standards, international principles on international organisation responsibility, the ICJ operational context and an explicit internal regulatory duty to focus on the consequences. Using respect for human dignity as a base line, remedies should help to restore the individual's autonomy and reputation and assist with rehabilitative and reintegrative needs.
Dealing with the Costs of Suspicion in International Criminal Justice
Issues related to acquittals in the international criminal justice field are increasingly attracting attention. 366 The inclusion of Article 85(3) ICCSt represented a statutory recognition of the problems faced by such persons at the UN Tribunals and the judicial inability to respond to their situation in the absence of a legal right to compensation under international law. The lack of political willingness at the UNSC to grant this judicial power to the UN Tribunals (attributed to cost concerns and the temporary nature of these courts) was disappointing due to the priority these institutions placed on protecting the rights of accused persons. 367 The power included in Article 85(3) may be viewed as a 'logical corollary' 368 to the due process approach adopted by the ICCSt that prioritises the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial. This new power in international (criminal) law bridges an important remedial gap. It reflects evolving law, policy and practice at both national and regional levels. It essentially provides the ICC with a scheme to address the costs of suspicion and related detention. While the ability to address the real and harmful consequences of wrongful international prosecution and detention is a welcome addition, both the objectives and the scope of the scheme are uncertain. Is this new judicial power an innovative step towards recognising the harm caused by excessive reliance on, and length of, detention in international criminal justice, or is it a legitimacy lever to be used to respond (or not) to instances of intense political reaction to judgments? On the one hand, Article 85(3) can be viewed as a form of social insurance that (re-)distributes the burden of international criminal justice process across society (and to an 366 See for example the project 'When Justice is Done' at <http://www.whenjusticeisdone.org/index.php/acquittedd> accessed June 2015. 367 See Beresford (n 30) 645. 368 Sheehy (n 64) 984.
institution with means to provide a remedy). 369 By accepting responsibility for mistakes, the legitimacy of international criminal justice process and public confidence in its outcomes can be enhanced. 370 Fairness also dictates the need for such a system on a number of grounds. As Beresford notes, it is illogical to compensate someone for an unlawful arrest but not for the harm caused by spending extended periods of time in detention. 371 Moreover, convicted persons can offset the time they spend in pre-judgment custody against any sentence imposed. 372 On the other hand, however, acquittals in the international criminal justice context have the propensity to be extremely controversial. 373 The discretionary basis of Article 85(3) may enable the Court to withhold a remedy in sensitive cases. There is also a danger that the provision can be used to address the costly impact of excessive detention without directly recognising violations of the right to liberty and a fair trial, and thereby as a means to avoid traditional remedies of release or re-trial.
The new judicial power should not be used to commodify or pay for infringements of fundamental rights. 374 The scheme should not be used to implicitly invert the illegality of situations of excessive detention in international remand centres. In relation to the scope of the scheme, the rules on eligibility and procedure will result in a very narrow range of potential claimants and a low likelihood of an award being made. The current eligibility thresholds (GMMMOJ and exceptional circumstances) should be removed. Guidelines and practice directions should be developed to define key terms, clarify requirements and set the foundation for principled decision-making. The appointed judges should be able to use their discretion to tailor the remedy to the individual claimant's needs.
In terms of the remedy that can be awarded, this requires independent and expert input. Moreover, the form of the remedy available should be broader than monetary recompense and the ICC should create a body tasked with the design and delivery of a comprehensive redress and support system that assists with reputational repair, rehabilitation and reintegration.
To conclude, Article 85(3) is to be welcomed as an innovative and progressive development in international criminal law. However, it remains unclear in what circumstances and for what purpose this scheme will be used. The scheme requires refinement, the removal of unnecessary obstacles and the form of available redress needs to be reconsidered.
